In re Cooper by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Cooper 53 Cal.2d 772 (1960).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/481
772 IN RE CoOPER [53 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 6510. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re GEORGE COOPER, on Habeas Corpus. 
[Crim. No. 6511. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re ABE S. TOBEROFF, on Habeas Corpus. 
[Crim. No. 6572. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re EDWIN D. RICH, on Habeas Corpus. 
[Crim. No. 6573. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re ALBERT G. JEFFERIES, on Habeas Corpus. 
[Crim. No. 6574. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re FLOYD L. CLEMENS, on Habeas Corpus. 
[Crim. No. 6575. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] 
In re RALPH LEVERSON, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Extradition - Uniform Oriminal Extradition Act - Oonstitu-
tionaJity.-Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (part of the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act), authorizing apprehension and extradition to 
another state of one who has, either in this state or a third 
state, committed an act intentionally resulting in a crime in 
the state whose executive authority is demanding the extra-
dition, is not invalid as violating the Constitution or statutes 
of the United States. The federal constitutional and statutory 
provisions are not exclusive, and the states are free to co-
operate with one another by extending interstate rendition 
beyond that required by federal law. 
[2] Id.-Uniform Criminal Extra.dition Act-Persons Extra.ditable. 
-A criminal who acts in one state to commit crimes in another 
may pose a far more serious problem to the latter state than 
one who commits a crime there and then fiees from justice, 
and the Legislature validly enacted Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (a part 
of the Uniform Criminal Extraoition Act), to pre .... ent the 
state's unwitting provision of an asylum for those who commit 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Extraoition, § 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Extradi-
tion, § 9. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Extradition, § 1; [2] Extradition, § 3; 
[3-8] Extradition, § 9; [9,10] Extradition, § 14. 
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crimes without being personally present at the place where the 
crimes are consummated. 
[3] lcl.-Demazul-Su1IicienC)' of Charge or Afticla.vit.-Since Pen. 
Code, 11548.2, provides that the essential .facts supporting a 
demand for extradiction may be charged either by an indict-
meot, an information or by an affidavit made before a magis-
trate, it is immaterial that indictments for distributing and 
advertising obscene literature did not allege the commission of 
acts in this state resulting in crimes in the demanding state, 
where such allegations were expressly set forth in the accom-
panying affidavits made before a magistrate by an investigator 
of the district attorney's oftlce. 
[4] Id.-Dema.nd-Su1IicienC)' of Charge or Afticla.vit.-Since the 
purpose of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure 
immediate arrests but to convince the respective Governors 
that extradition is justified, it is immaterial that the magis-
trate did not act on the affidavits by issuing warrants. Pen. 
Code, § 1548.2, does not require that a warrant accompany a 
demand based on an affidavit, but only that "any warrant 
which was issued thereon" be included. 
[6] Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of Oharge or Aftida.vit.-Though affi-
davits on information and belief accompanying- a demand for 
extradition do not set forth the amants' sources of informa-
tion or reasons for belief that petitioners had committed the 
offenses charged, the PUfpose of the requirement that they do 
so is fully met when the indictments, also accompanying the 
demand and charging distribution of obscene literature and 
related offenses, establish reasonable cause to believe peti-
tioners guilty of the offenses charged and the affidavits are 
based on petitioners' California activities (resulting in crimes 
committed in another state), it being presumed that sufficient 
evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the 
indictments. 
[8] Id.-Demand-SufficienC)' of Oharge or Aftidavit.-Pen. Code, 
II 1549.1, 1548.2, do not provide that the indictment or affi-
davit alone must sufficiently allege all facts necessary to sup-
port extradition under I 1549.1; to add such a provision would 
exalt form over substance. 
[7] Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of Oharge or AJlidavit.-Protection 
from unjustified extradition does not lie in reading into the 
extradition laws purely technical requirements that a fore-
warned prosecutor could easily meet, but in the sound judg-
ment of the respective Governors charged with administration 
of those laws. Their judgment is entitled to great weight. 
[8] Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of-Charge or AJlidavit.-When it ap-
pears that the affidavit supporting extradition was regarded by 
the executive authority of the respective states concerned as 
a aWRoient basis in law for acting-the one in making a requi-
) 
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sition, the other in issuing a warrant for the arrest of the 
alleged fugitive-the judiciary should not interfere on habeas 
corpus nnd discharge the accused on teclmical grounds unless 
it be clear that what was done was in plain contravention of 
law. 
[9] Id.-Habeas Oorpus.-Courts of the asylum state need not and 
should not review the constitutionality of the statute alleged 
to have been violated. Its constitutionality may depend on 
how it will- be interpreted and applied by the courts of the 
demanding state in defendant's case; but if it clearly appeared 
that a statute were void on its face or had been held to be 
void on its face by the highest court of the demanding state 
or by the United States Supreme Court, the indictment, in-
formation or affidavit would then fail to "substantially charge 
the person demanded with having committed a crime under 
the law of [the demanding] State" (Pen. Code, § 1548.2), and 
defendant should then be discharged. 
[10] Id.-Habeas Corpus.-In habeas corpus proceedings chal-
lenging the validity of proceedings to extradite petitioners to 
another state to stand trial for the distribution of obscene 
literature and related offenses, petitioners could not success-
fully contend that the Supreme Court of the demanding state 
in effect determined that the obscenity law under which they 
were indicted was void on its face by its holding that a related 
statute was void for vagueness, where there were substantial 
differences in the two statutes, where similar statutes were 
sustained by the United States Supreme Court, ... where 
the Supreme Court of the demanding state was free to in-
terpret the statute in question to make it valid under the 
federal decisions. The effect of a statutory amendment on 
prosecutions commenced prior to its date was a question for 
courts of the demanding state, and Congress has not pre-
empted the field by enacting a federal statute punishing the 
mailing or advertising by mail of obscene material. 
PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus challenging validity of 
proceedings to extradite petitioners to Pennsylvania to stand 
trial for the distribution of obscene literature mailed from 
California and related offenses. Writs denied and petitioners 
remanded to custody. 
Milton Wichner, Brock, Fleishman & Rykoff, Stanley Fleish-
man, -Prentiss Moore, George E. Lindelof, Jr., William A. 
Munnell, Leonard S. Sands, Herbert S. Nusbaum and Edwin 
M. Rosendahl for Petitioners. 
[9] See Oal . .Tur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 44 et seq.; A.m..Tur., Habeal 
Corp1l8, I f11 et seq. 
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William B. McKesson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), 
Jere J. Sullivan and Harry Wood, Deputy District Attorneys, 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
petitioners challenge the validity of proceedings to extradite 
them to Pennsylvania to stand trial for the distribution of 
obscene literature and related offenses. We issued orders 
to show cause direct.ed to the sheriff of Los Angeles County 
and ordered petitioners released on bail. In his return the 
sheriff alleges that he took custody of petit.ioners pursuant 
to extradition warrants issued by the Governor of California. 
Copies of the warrants were filed with the return, and the 
original supporting papers from the Governor of Pennsyl-
vania to the Governor of California were lodged with the 
court and a motion made that they be filed. These documents 
disclose that petitioners were indicted for crimes committed 
in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Three petitioners 
were indicted for distributing and advertising obscene litera-
ture, and three for distributing and conspiring to distribute 
such literature. The crimes were allegedly committed in one 
case in 1956, in two cases in 1957, and in three cases in 1958. 
Pennsylvania seeks extradition, not under federal law on 
the ground that petitioners committed crimes in Pennsylvania 
and then fled from that state (see U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, 
clause 2; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3182; Pen. Code, §§ 1548.1-1548.2), 
but under section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition 
Act (Pen. Code, § 1549.1) on the ground that in mailing 
obscene literature in California to Pennsylvania each peti-
tioner committed "an act in this State . . . intentionally 
resulting in a crime in" Pennsylvania. (Pen. Code, § 1549.1.) 
[ 1 ] Petitioners contend that since such extradition is not 
authorized by the United States Constitution or by federal 
statute, section 1549.1 is invalid. It is settled, however, that 
the federal constitutional and statutory provisions are not 
exclusive and that the states are free to cooperate with one 
another by extending interstate rendition beyond that required 
by federal law. (People of the State of New York v. O'Neill, 
359 U.S. 1 [79 S.Ct. 564, 568, 570, 3 L.Ed.2d 585]; In re 
Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 677 [128 P.2d 338]; In re Davis, 
68 Cal.App.2d 798, 802-807 [158 P.2d 36]; In re Morgan, 
86 Cal.App.2d 217, 223 [194 P.2d 800] ; Ex parte Morga.n, 78 
F.Supp. 756, 761, aff'd, Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F.2d 404, 
407; see 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (1957) 299.) 
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The United States Supreme Court approved such coopera-
tion in sustaining a Florida statute (Fla. Stat. 1957, §§ 942.01-
942.06, F.S.A.) based on the Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings. (9 Uniform Laws Annotated (1957) 91.) "The' 
Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and re-
sourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It 
is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements 
which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative 
actions of individual States with a view to increasing har-
mony within the federalism created by the Constitution. Far 
from being divisive, this legislation is a catalyst of cohesion. 
It is within the unrestricted area left to the States by the 
Constitution." (People of the State of New York v. O'Neill, 
supra, 359 U. S. 1, 6.) 
[2] Modern communication and transportation facilitate 
the commission of crimes across state lines. A criminal who 
acts in one state to commit crimes in another may pose a 
far more serious problem to the latter state than one who 
commits a crime there and then flees from justice. When 
the criminal who commits his crime entirely in one state flees, 
he ordinarily poses no threat of additional crimes therein; 
if extradition fails, there is only frustration of that state's 
interest in punishing him. In contrast, the criminal who 
operates from without the state's borders poses a continuing 
threat. Since his conduct may be undetected or apparently 
harmless in the state where he acts, the only effective impetus 
for prosecution may come from the state that suffers the 
harm. Far more divisive than a state's refusal to extradite 
a fugitive for a past offense would be its unwitting provision 
not only of a base of operation but of an asylum for those 
who commit crimes without being personally present at the 
place where their crimes are consummated. The Legislature 
validly enacted section 1549.1 to prevent that result. 
Section 1549.1 provides that "The Governor of this State 
may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority 
of any other State, any person in this State charged in such 
other State in the manner provided in section 1548.2 of this 
code with committing an act in this State, Or in a third 
State, intentionally resulting in a crime in the State whose 
executive authority is making the demand. . . ." Section 
1548.2 provides that the demand "shall be accompanied by 
a copy of an indictment found or by information or by a 
copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate in the demand-
) 
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ing State together with a copy of allY warrant which was 
issued thereon. . . ." In the present cases, each demand it> 
accompanied by an indictment charging the defendant named 
therein with committing crimes in Pennsylvania and an affi-
davit made before a magistrate by an investigator of the 
district attorney's office. The affidavits are titled" Criminal 
Complaint for Warrant of Arrest" and the facts stated are 
set forth as "true and correct according to the best of [the 
affiant's] knowledge, information and belief." They describe 
petitioners' distribution of obscene literature in Pennsylvania 
by mail from California and each contains a paragraph in 
substantially the following form: "Deponent further avers 
that, by reason of the said act and acts of depositing the said 
literature and written and printed matter in the United 
States Mail for delivery and distribution to the said private 
citizens in and about the said City and County of Phila-
delphia, and well knowing and intending that the said litera-
ture would be so delivered and distributed, the said FLoYD 
CLEJrlMENS did do such act and acts in the said State of 
California which intentionally resulted in the commission 
of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said 
City and County of Philadelphia as prohibited by the Act 
of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, and which 
is against the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth." 
[3] Since section 1548.2 provides that the essential facts 
may be charged either by an indictment, an information, or 
by an affidavit made before a magistrate, it is immaterial 
that the indictments did not allege the commission of acts 
in this state intentionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania. 
Such allegations were expressly set forth in the affidavits. 
[4] It is contended, howcver, that the affidavits are in-
sufficient on the ground that the magistrate did not act on 
them by issuing warrants. Since the purpose of affidavits 
to support extradition is not to secure immediate arrests 
but to convince the respective Governors that extradition 
is justmed, it is immaterial that the magistrate did not 
act on the affidavits. (People ex reI. Gates v. Mulcahy, 392 
Ill. 498 [65 N.E.2d 21, 22] ; see People ex reI. Moore v. Skinner, 
284 App.Div. 770 [135 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109] ; Ex parle Pe.airs, 
162 Tex.Crim.Rep. 243 [283 S.W.2d 755, 756-757].) Thus, 
section 1548.2 does not require that a warrant accompany 
a demand based upon an affidavit but ollly that" any warrant 
which was issued thereon" shall be included. (C/., In re 
) 
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Murphy, 321 Mass. 206 [72 N.E.2d 413, 417], applying Massa-
chusetts statute requiring that warrant accompany the affi-
davit.) 
[6] It is further contended that affidavits made 'on in-
formation and belief are insufficient to support extradition 
unless the sources of information and reasons for belief are 
stated so that the Governors involved and the court in habeas 
corpus proceedinzs may determine whether extradition is war-
ranted. (See Rice v. Amu, 180 U.S. 371, 374-376 [21 S.Ct. 
406, 45 L.Ed. 577] ; Stark v. liivermore, 3 N.J. Super. 94 [65 
A.2d 625, 627] ; People ex reI. Ma,eSherry v. Enright, 112 
Misc. 568 [184 N.Y.S. 248, 252]; State ex reI. Phillips v. 
Garren, 186 S.C. 333 [195 S.E. 834, 835] ; Ex parte Murray, 
112 S.C. 342 [99 S.E. 798, 800, 5 A.L.R. 1152] ; cf. State ex reI. 
Hogan v. Moeller, 191 Minn. 193 [253 N.W. 668, 669] ; People 
v. Mulcahy, supra, 392 Ill. 498 [65 N.E.2d 21, 22] ; Ex parte 
Paulson, 168 Ore. 457 [124 P.2d 297, 302-303] ; People ex reI. 
De Martini v. McLaughlin, 243 N.Y. 417 [153 N.E. 853, 854] ; 
Ex parte Oooper, 163 Tex.Crim.Rep. 642 [295 S.W.2d 906, 
907] ; Ex parte Logan, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 129 [205 S.W.2d 
994, 995] ; United States ex reI. McOUne v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 
716, 718; Raftery ex reI. Huie Fong v. Bligh, 55 F.2d 189, 
194; Ex parte Hart, 63 F. 249, 259-260 [11 C.C.A. 165, 28 
L.R.A. 801] ; Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 307.) The affidavits 
do not set forth the affiants' sources of information or reasons 
for belief that petitioners had committed the offenses charged, 
but the purpose of the requirement that they do so is fully 
met when as in these cases the indictments establish reasonable 
cause to believe petitioners guilty of the offenses charged and 
the affidavits demonstrate that the indictments are based on 
petitioners' California activities. Thus in each case the affi-
davit and indictment dovetail to meet the requirements of 
sections 1549.1 and 1548.2. The affiants and other witnesses 
appeared before the grand jury. Since it is undisputed that 
at all relevant times petitioners have been in California, the 
indictments are obviously based on petitioners' mail-order 
businesses conducted from this state and concern the very 
criminal transactions set forth in the affidavits. It must be 
presumed that sufficient evidence was presented to the grand 
jury to support the indictments, and as prosecuting witnesses 
the affiants knew of their own knowledge that the indictments 
were based on petitioners' California activities. Under such 
circumstances the respective Governors were bound to know . 
that the indictments were based on petitioners' activities set . 
) 
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forth in the affidavits, including their acts in California inten-
tionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania. 
[6] Sections 1549.1 and 1548.2 do not provide that the 
indictment alone or the affidavit alone must sufficiently allege 
all of the facts necessary to support extradition under section 
1549.1. To add such a provision would exalt form over sub-
stance. [ 7 ] Protection from Wljustified extradition does 
not lie in reading into the extradition laws purely technical 
requirements that a forewarned prosecutor could easily meet, 
but in the sound judgment of the respective Governors charged 
with the administration of those laws. Their judgment is 
entitled to great weight. [8] As the United States Supreme 
Court stated, in reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to 
support extradition pursuant to federal law, "When it ap-
pears, as it does here, that the affidavit in question was re-
garded by the executive authority' of the respective States 
concerned as a sufficient basis, in law, for their acting-the 
one in making a requisition, the other in issuing a warrant for 
the arrest of the alleged fugitive- the judiciary should not 
interfere, on habeas corpus, and discharge the accused, upon 
technical grounds, and unless it be clear that what was done 
was in plain contravention of law." (Oampton v . .Alabama, 
214 U.S. 1, 8 [29 8.Ct. 605, 53 L.Ed. 885] ; see also State ex reI. 
Trigg v. Thampson, 196 Tenn. 147 [270 S.W.2d 332, 333-334J ; 
Stark v. Livermore, supra, 3 N.J. Super. 94 [65 A.2d 625, 
627].) 
Petitioners contend that Pennsylvania's obscenity statute 
(18 Purdon's Pa. Stats., § 4524) is unconstitutional and that 
therefore they should not be extradited for violating it. [9] It 
has been held that the courts of the asylum state in habeas 
corpus proceedings need not (Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 
314 [15 S.Ct. 116, 39 L.Ed. 164]) and should not review the 
constitutionality of the statute that is alleged to have been 
violated. (In re Uran, 138 Ca1.App.2d 479, 480-481 [292 P.2d 
225] ; Ex parte Key, 164 Tex. Crim. Rep. 524 [301 S.W.2d 
90, 91J; UlZam v. Davis, 169 Miss. 208 [150 So. 519, 521] ; 
Ex parte Peairs, supra, 162 Tex. Crim. Rep. 243 [283 S.W.2d 
755,757] ; see also State v. Clough, 71 N.H. 594 [53 A. 1086, 
1092] ; Johnson v. Matthews, 182F.2d 677, 682; Ross v. Mid-
dlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308, 310-311; In re Backstron, 98 Cal.App. 
2d 500, 501-503 [220 P.2d 742].) Its constitutionality may 
depend on how it will be interpreted and applied by the courts 
of the demanding state in the defendant's case. Of course, if 
) 
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it clearly appearcd that a statute were void on its face or had 
been held to be void on its face by the highest court of the 
demanding statc or by the United States Supreme COJIrt, the 
indictment, information, or affidavit would then fail to "sub-
stantially charge the person demanded with having committed 
a crime under the law of [the demanding] State" (Pen Code, 
§ 1548.2), and the defendant should then be discharged. (See 
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387,404-405 [28 S.Ct. 714, 52 L.Ed. 
1113] ; In re Katcher, 39 Ca1.2d 30, 31 [243 P.2d 785] ; Cassis 
v. Fair, 126 W.Va. 557 [29 S.E.2d 245, 249, 151 A.L.R. 233].) 
[10] Petitioners contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has in effect determined that the obscenity law under 
which they have been indicted (18 Purdon's Pa. Stats., 
§ 4524) is void on its face by its holding that a related statute 
(18 Purdon's Pa. Stats., § 4528) is void for vagueness. (Com-
monwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417 [153 A.2d 227].) We 
have examined section 45281 and also section 4524 as it read 
both before2 and after3 its amendment in 1957. Although there 
'''Whoever gives or participates in, or being the owner of any premo 
ises, or having control thereof, permits within or on said premises, any , 
dramatic, theatrical, operatic, or vaudeville exhibition, or the exhibition 
of fixed or moving pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, 
or immoral nature and charaeter, or such as might tend to corrupt morals, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sen· 
tenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars (t500), or undergo ' 
inlprisonment for a period not exceeding one (1) year, or both. 1939, 
June 24, PL. 872, ~ 528." 
"'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gives away, or shows or 
offers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show, or has in 
his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away or to 
show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, 
storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, pLotograph, figure or image, or any 
written or printed matter of an ind"ecnt character, or any article or in-
strument of indecent or immoral use or purponing to be for indecent or 
immoral use or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws, photographs, 
prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or prepares any 
such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, 
paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing, or whoever writes, 
prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed, published or uttered, 
any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving information, directly or 
indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, how, of whom, or by 
what means any, or what purports to be, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, disgusting or indecent book, picture, writing, paper, figure, inlage, 
matter, article or thing named in this section can be purchasetl, obtained 
or had, or whoever prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, or 
shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, giye away, or 
show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan or gift, or distribution, any 
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the' 
pUblication and principally made up of criminal news, police reports or ' 
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures of stories of deeds of bloodshed, 
lust or crime, or whoever hires, employs, uses or pennits any minor or 
) 
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are substantial similarities in language, there are also sub-
stantial differences, and we cannot say that because it invali-
dated section 4528, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
lle('essaril~' hold section 4524 void. Similar statutes were sus-
tained as applied and interpreted in Roth v. Un'ited States and 
Albc1'is v. California, 354 U.S. 476 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1498], and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is free to inter-
pret section 4524 to make it ,-alid under those decisions. There 
is no merit in the contention that section 4524 is void on its 
face because it does not expressly require that the defendant. 
haye knowledge that the proseribed material is obscene. The 
statute may reasonably be interpreted as making knowledge 
an element of the offense (see Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d 
676,685 [249 P.2d 267) ; Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 
39 Ca1.2d 698, 702 [249 P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145]) ; so inter-
child to do or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment. not cxceeding one (1) year, or to pay a fine not exceeding 
five IJundrcd dollars ($500), or both. 1939, June 24, PL. 872,9524." 
'" Obscene Werature consists of any writing, or printed matter, picture, 
inmge, drawing, figure, photograph or other pictorial representation, 
which is uurel:Jtcd to sciene,e, art or scientific study, and taken as a whole 
is indecent, lewd, lascivious, and has the effect of inciting to lewdness 
or sexual crime. 'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gil"cS away, 
or shows or of! ers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show, 
or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away 
or to show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene literature 
or lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pam· 
phlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, photograph, figure 
or image, or any written or printed matter of an indecent character, or 
any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purporting to be 
for indecent or immoral usc or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws, 
photographs. prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or 
prepares any such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, news· 
paper, storypaper, paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing, 
or whoen'r writes, prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed, 
published or utt.cred, any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving 
information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, 
ltOw, of wl,om, or by what means any, or what purports to be, any ob· 
s~enE', lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting or indecent book, picture, writ· 
ing, paper, figure, image, matter, article or thing named in this section 
can he plJr<·ha.ed, obtained or had, or whoever prints, utters, publishes, 
sells, lend,;, gives away, or 81,ow8, or has in his possession with intent 
to scli, knd. give away, or show, or otherwise offers for pale, loan or 
gift, or distribution, any pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed 
paper de\'oted to the publication and principally made up of criminal 
news, polirE' reports or 8C'('ounts of criminal deeds, or pictures of stories 
of dE'E'ds of bloodshed, lust or crime, or whoever hires, employs, lIses 
or permits :my minor or ehihl to do or assist in doing any act or thing 
mentioned in this section, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction, shall 
be sentenced to imprisonment not ('xeeeding two (2) years, or to pay a 
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars (E'!WOO), or both. As amended 
1957, July 17, P.L. 973, 91." 
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preted it would not be invalid as imposing strict criminal 
liability. (Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 514·515 
[68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 
273, 277 [35 S.Ct. 383, 59 L.Ed. 573].) Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147 [80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205], is not to the 
contrary, for in that case the state court had interpreted the 
ordinance there involved as eliminating knowledge of the char-
acter of the proscribed literature as an element of the offense, 
and it was only as so interpreted that the Supreme Court 
held the ordinance void. 
Petitioners contend, however, that the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature has recognized the invalidity of section 4524 as it read 
at the times here relevant by amending it in 1959 to set forth 
the standard of obscenity approved in the Roth and Alberts 
cases. The effect of the 1959 amendment on prosecutions 
commenced prior to its date is a question for the Pennsylvania 
courts, and we find no basis for concluding that that amend-
ment absolved petitioners of responsibility for violations al-
leged to have occurred before its date. 
Petitioners' contention that the Pennsylvania statute may 
not be applied to their mail-order business on the ground that 
Congress preempted the field by enacting the federal statute 
punishing the mailing or advertising by mail of obscene 
material (18 U.S.C.A., § 1461) was answered adversely to 
them in the Alberts case. (354 U.S. 476, 493-494.) 
The motion to file the lodged documents is granted. The 
orders to show cause are discharged, the petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus are denied, and petitioners are remanded to 
custody. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and White, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-Although I agree that the interpretation, 
application, and constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute 
under which petitioners have been indicted are questions (at 
least initially) for the Pennsylvania courts, I cannot agree 
that the papers which accompany the Pennsylvania demands 
for extradition are sufficient to support such demands. In 
the case of each petitioner the only averment in such papers 
that he committed "an act in this State . . . intentionally 
resulting in a crime in the States whose executive authority 
is making the demand" (Pen. Code, § 1549.1) is in the 
"Criminal Complaint for "Tarrant for Arrest," sworn to be-
fore a magistrate by an investigator for the Philadelphia 
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district attorney. Each such complaint avers that "to the 
best of ... [the affiant's] knowledge, information and be-
lief . . . investigation and inquiry has disclosed" that the 
named petitioner by dePQsiting obscene literature in the 
United States mail for distribution to private citizens in 
Philadelphia, "did do such act and acts in the said State 
of California which intentionally resulted in the commission 
of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said 
City and County of Philadelphia." 
I would not suggest that the governor or the courts of this 
state, when extradition is sought, should go behind a formal 
charge by information or indictment in the demanding state 
and inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence. In re Letcher 
(1904), 145 Cal. 563, 564 [79 P. 65], holds that such in-
quiry is not proper. However, I do believe that where, as 
here, it is necessary to resort to an affidavit before a magis-
trate in order to determine whether the accused is extraditable 
as one who intentionally committed an act in California re-
sulting in a crime in the demanding state, averments on 
information and belief which do not state the sources of 
affiant's information or the grounds of his belief, are in-
sufficient. The following considerations concerning charges 
against those whose extradition as actual fugitives is sought 
under federal statute are at least as applicable to the situa-
tion here, where the demanding state seeks the surrender of 
persons who assertedly committed criminal acts in this state 
intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state: 
"A citizen ought not to be deprived of his personal liberty 
upon an allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount 
to nothing more than a suspicion." (Rice v. Antes (1901), 
180 U.S. 371, 374 [21 S.Ct. 406,45 L.Ed. 577].) "Charges 
are not verified by an affidavit that somebody is informed 
and believes that they are true. This is mere evasion of the 
law; the most improbable stories may be believed of anyone, 
and the man most free from any reasonable suspicion of guilt 
is not safe if he holds his freedom at the mercy of any man 
three hundred [or more than two thousand] miles off, who 
will swear that he has been informed and believed in his 
guilt." (Swart v. KimbaU (1880),43 Mich. 443, 451 [5 N.W. 
635], quoted with approval in Ex parte Spears (1891), 88 
Cal. 640, 642 [26 P. 608, 22 Am.St.Rep. 341].) 
Obviously extradition can result in great inconvenience 
and substantial damage to the accused. While t.his state should 
not hesitate to honor the proper demand of a sister state, it 
. 
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is my OpInIOn that when California sanctions the upsetting 
of the life and affairs of its residents by surrendering them 
to the authorities of another state, this state can and Rhould 
require not merely a perfunctory assertion of belief by some-
one in the demanding state but a showing that there has 
been an official determination in the demanding state resulting 
iIi a formal charge by indictment or information or, if the 
charge is by affidavit before a magistrate, a showing by such 
affidavit that the charge is based upon something more than 
the accuser's belief. 
The return of an indictment presupposes the receipt of evi-
dence before the grand jury and the filing of an information 
presupposes that evidence has been appraised by the prose-
cuting attorney, an officer of the court experienced in evaluat-
ing evidence (and, in states with procedure such as that of 
California, that witnesses have been examined before a'magis-
trate and the magistrate has found that a public offense has 
been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the 
defendant guilty of it). But a mere hearsay affidavit (even 
where, like the complaints here, it is made by an official 
investigator) stating that the affiant for undisclosed reasons 
believes that the accused committed acts in California which 
intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding state, in 
my opinion, does not justify removal of the accused to the 
state wherE' the affiant has expressed such belief. 
The majority say (ante, p. 778) that "in each case the 
[hcar:oay] affidavit and [the] indictment dovetail to meet 
tll(' requirements of sections 1549.1 and 1548.2." They reach 
this conclusion because, on their view, "It must be presumed 
that ... as prosecuting witnesses the affiants knew of their 
own knowledge that the indictments were based on petitioners' 
California activities" and "Under such circumstances the re-
spective Governors were bound to know that the indictments 
were based on petitioners' activities set forth in the affidavits, 
including their acts in California intentionally resulting in 
crimes in Penns?lvania," It does not appear to me that the 
California courts must presume or that the governors of 
Pennsylvania and California are bound to know that, because I 
the affiants for unstated reasons believe that petitioners com- ' 
mitted acts in California intentionally resulting in a crime 
in Pennsylvania, the indictments which contain no such aver-
ments are in fact charges based upon such asserted California 
acts and intentions. A sufficient charge of acts in California 
intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state 
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is a prerequisite to extradition under section 1549.1 of the 
Penal Code just as a "substantial" charge of crime is a pre-
requisite to extradition under either section 1549.1 or section 
1548.2. If the indictment wholly omitted to charge essential 
elements of a crime, would the majority hold that these es-
sential elements could be "substantially" supplied by the 
affidavit before a magistrate, made by someone who was 
also a witness before the grand jury, that he believed in their 
existence' '1 would not. 
In rejecting the contention that the affidavits are insuffi-
cient because the magistrate did not issue warrants of arrest 
based upon them the majority say (ante, p. 777) that the 
failure to issue warrants is immaterial" [s]ince the purpose 
of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure immediate 
arrests but to convince the respective Governors that extra-
dition is justified." While I agree that the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest by a magistrate of the demanding state is 
not a prerequisite to extradition, the quoted statement of the 
majority seems to contain the suggestion that where an in-
dictment, information, or affidavit (yerified complaint) before 
a magistrate in the demanding state is not a sufficient charge 
to support extradition, that procedure can nevertheless be 
effected if someone in the demanding state goes before a 
magistrate and makes supplementary "affidavits to support 
extradition. " I cannot agree with any suggestion that purely 
evidentiary affidavits not charging a crime would be sufficient 
to supplement a charge which is defective on its face (el. 
In re Davis (1945),68 Cal.App.2d 798, 809 [3] [158 P.2d 36]). 
For the reasons above stated, it is my opinion that the 
petitions should be granted and the petitioners should be 
discharged from custody. 
McComb, J., and Peters, J 0' concurred. 
Petitioners' applications for a rehearing were denied March 
30,1960. Schauer, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., were of the 
opinion that the applications should be granted. 
